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REQUISITES FOR EQUITABLE PROTECTION
AGAINST TORTS
By WiLmAm Q. DE FUNIAK*
It may be stated as a general rule that whenever a person
threatens or undertakes to perform any act affecting property,
contrary to the legal right of another, the consequences of
which will be permanent or irreparable injury to the property,
equity will give relief by way of injunctive decree.' To justify
a suit for injunctive relief, it is not necessary that any injurious
act shall actually have been done by the defendant. When there
is reasonable probability of injury, when the intention to do
the wrong has been clearly manifested, equity at once interferes.
However, mere idle words or mere possibility of injury do not
suffice. On the other hand, no one can complain that equity
has taken him at his word.2
Nor is it any sufficient answer to the suit for the defendant
to come in and say that he no longer harbors his wrongful pur-
pose but has abandoned it. The court will not leave the plaintiff
to the good will of a defendant who has once shown an intention
to disregard his rights, but will by its decree take care that the
defendant's good professions are carried out. Of course, if the
court is satisfied that there is no likelihood of the occurrence or
repetition, as the case may be, of the wrong complained of, and
evidence of abandonment or repentance is convincing, the court
may deny the application for injunction. 3
Relief can be accomplished, if necessary, by requiring the
taking of any affirmative or positive steps to remove or render
* LL.B., Univ. of Virginia, LL.M., Umv. of San Francisco; Pro-
fessor of Law, Univ. of San Francisco.
'See MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 18 (1895).
"Reasonable probability is important, since mere possibility or
anything short of reasonable probability of injury is said to be in-
sufficient to warrant equitable relief. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Waldron,
96 Cal. 243, 31 Pac. 54 (1892). Cf. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg.
Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Ati. 392 (1907), as to "possibility of injury."
'Snyder v. Gurney, 43 F Supp. 204 (1942).
The court should, nevertheless, proceed to allow substitutional
redress by way of money damages. Lewis v North Kingstown, 16
R. I. 15, 11 Ati. 173, 27 Am. St. Rep. 724 (1887). That this should
not include prospective damages, see Cox v. City of New York, 265
N. Y. 411, 193 N. E. 251, 105 A. L. R. 1378 (1934).
L. J.-3
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harmless the source or cause of the threatened injury (consis-
tent, of course, with the practicability of supervising and mak-
ing effective the order or decree) If the act has already been
committed and, with reasonable probability, will be continued
or repeated, equity can compel the wrongdoer to desist in future
from repetition of the wrong and, as well, compel him to repair
the injury which he has already done, to the extent that this is
possible. Repairing the injury may consist of payment of pe-
cuniary compensation, since it has long been established m
equity that pecuniary compensation may be granted as an in-
cident of the injunctive relief,4 or it may consist of positive or
affirmative acts to remove or to discontinue the cause or source
of injury,5 or both.6
From the foregoing it is necessary to branch off on dis-
cussions of several interrelated matters. For one, what is prop-
erty? For another, what is permanent or irreparable injury2
Both of these matters are of importance in view of the principle
that equity does not assume jurisdiction where there is an ade-
quate remedy at law and the principle, although subject nowa-
days to exception,7 that equity does not assume jurisdiction
except to protect property and property rights. And conceding
that a sufficient so-called property right or interest is present,
'Originally, in the separate courts of chancery or equity this was
frequently done by exacting an accounting of the profits of a wrong-
ful act or sometimes by the allowance of damages as an incident to
the granting of equitable relief, as the circumstances warranted. In
the code states, damages may be obtained m the same proceeding as
an injunction. These, as formerly, may usually be assessed by the
court as an incident of the equitable relief, without the necessity of
a jury See Judson v Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168,
106 Pac. 581, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 183, 21 Ann. Cas. 1247 (1910). That
this should not include prospective damages, see Cox v. City of New
fork, supra, n. 3.
'Where continuing injury was being done to plaintiff by abuse
of license to pile rocks on plaintiff's land, defendant was ordered
to remove the rocks. Wheelock v Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179, 15 N.E. 67,
2 Am. St. Rep. 405 (1888). At law the plaintiff would have had to
assume what would have amounted to an unconscionable burden of
removing the rocks himself and suing for the cost thereof or else
allow the rocks to remain and recover damages based on the rental
value of the land.
'See The Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (1909), cert. den. 215
U.S. 603, 30 Sup. Ct. 405, 45 L.Ed. 345 (1909), noted (1910) 23
HARV. L. REV. 390.
' See de Funiak, Equitable Protection of Personal or Individual
Rights (1947) 36 Ky. L. J. 7.
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does the threat of permanent or irreparable injury present the
only situation in which the remedy at law will be madequateg
Or do other situations instanced by the courts as those in winch
the remedy at law is inadequate constitute, in effect, situations
of irreparable injury?
Conduct of the complainant which may affect his ability
to obtain equitable relief must also be considered.
PROPERTY AND OTHER RIGHTS OF SUBSTANCE
The development of equity during a period when property
rights rather than personal or individual rights were para-
mount has beeen referred to by me in a previous article.8 The
result has been the repeated statement of the principle that
equity intervenes or interposes only to protect property and
rights and interests therein. So, as equitable relief was extended
to the field of torts, its protection was confined to the protection
of property and rights therein. It must be kept in mind, then,
that though there have been departures from this prerequisite
to equity jurisdiction in the past and though there is a growing
tendency to depart from it, the rule is still followed rigidly m
many jurisdictions and is given at least lip service in many
others.
Since real property and rights therein were, in early Eng-
land, the chief sources of wealth, power and influence, equitable
relief against torts developed in relation to real property, against
the torts of waste, trespass and nuisance. Gradually, by reason
of the national growth and the consequent complexities of the
modern social and economic order, the concept of property was
extended to include intangibles as well as tangibles, in other
words incorporeal things of value. The term "property" thus
came to include the right to carry on a lawful business, with all
the incidents thereof which gave or added value to a business.
Whether the right to carry on a lawful business, or for that
matter the power to earn a living, is strictly a property right or a
personal right is now an academic question. The fact is that
equity has termed business and similar rights of substance to be
property rights in order to justify its interposition, on the
8 See de Fumak, op. cit., supra n. 7.
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ground of protecting property and property rights. Thus the
idea of property has been extended to include what are some-
times termed rights of substance, in the nature of property
rights, having a pecuniary value. 9
There is no reason why equity should not extend its relief
to all cases of substantial rights conferred by law, whether such
rights of substance are termed personal rights or property
rights. In this country we recognize many rights of substance
other than so-called property rights, and neither the common
law nor statutory remedies may provide the complete and ade-
quate protection of such rights and the prevention of injury to
them which equity can afford. Certainly, so far as property
rights or rights in the nature thereof have been concerned,
equity looks to their importance to the complainant and may
consider them substantial as to him, without requiring a great
pecuniary value.' 0
ADEQUACY or INADEQUACY OF REzEDY AT LAW
The development of equity as a system of jurisprudence to
supply the deficiencies or inadequacies of the relief available
at common law in the courts of law and the unwillingness of
equity to infringe on or invade the province of the courts of law
have resulted in the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of
the remedy at law in a given case becoming one of inportance.
It is considered as prerequisite to equity jurisdiction that there
be no remedy at law available or that it be inadequate." By
inadequate is meant that the remedy at law is not so speedy,
'See de Funiak, Equitable Protection of Business and Business
Rights (1947) 35 Ky. L. J. 261.
" See Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal. App. 119, 180 Pac. 57(1919), where defendant had prescriptive right to maintain irriga-
tion ditch on plaintiff's land. When a large part of the ditch was
washed away by a flood, defendant began construction of new ditch
at a different point, claiming right to maintain ditch anywhere on
plaintiff's land. The value of the land so taken was only $12. It was
held that the easement included no right to change the mode of use
or enjoyment by shifting it and that so long as a substantial right
of plaintiff was involved, whatever its small pecuniary value, he was
entitled to have such right protected.
11 See LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1929), Ch. VII; Mc-
CLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY (1936), Sec. 41, WALsH, TREATISE
ON EQUITY (1930), Sec. 25.
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practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt ad-
ministration as the remedy in equity 12
Where law and equity are administered in separate courts,
the decision of the equity court in a given case that there is an
adequate remedy at law results in the dismissal of the suit in
equity Delay and expense are thus imposed on the complainant
who must begin all over again in another court. It is true that
in more recent periods there have developed frequent situations
in which the equity court has awarded some form of temporary
relief while the action in the court of law is being tried, as well
as the fact that statutes have frequently been enacted to soften
the difficulties brought about by two sets of courts.13
The situation is much less harsh in jurisdictions where code
or statutory provisions have merged legal and equitable powers
in one court. The substantive differences between the two sys-
tems of jurisprudence, law and equity, still remain, in that the
complainant seeking equitable relief may still have to show that
there is no adequate legal remedy available. But if it develops
that there is an adequate legal remedy, no dismissal of the pro-
ceedings follows, since the court under its merged powers may
proceed to give the relief called for by the issues. 14 At most the
complainant is required only to amend his complaint to ask for
the legal relief which has been determined to be available and
adequate.i 5
IRREPARABLE INJURY
Irreparable injury has been defined as that which cannot
be repaired, restored or adequately compensated in money or
where the compensation cannot be safely measured.' 6 On the
other hand it has been said that irreparable injury does not
"Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 L.Ed. 655 (1830).
" See de Fumak, Equitable Protection against Waste and Tres-
pass (1948) 36 Ky. L. J. 255.
"See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF Civ. PRoc., Sec. 580; N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
ACT, Sec. 275. See also Clark, The Unzon of Law and Equity (1925)
25 COL. L. REv. 1, CLARK, CODE PLEADING 44 et seq. (1928), discussing
the frequent inconsistences and hostility of the courts in dealing
with this problem.
INevertheless, some courts in code states have insisted on dis-
missal. See Clark, op. cit. Supra, n. 14.
11Bettman v Harness, 42 W Va. 433, 26 S.E. 271, 36 L.R.A. 566
(1896).
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mean, that the injury is beyond the possibility of repair or be-
yond the possibility of compensation in damages, but rather that
the injury is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no
fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in an action at
law 17 It will be noticed that the latter statement seems more di-
rectly addressed to a wrong of a continuing or repeated nature
rather than to one threatened initially is
In short, then, it would seem that the standard is that some
or all of the very substance of the estate or property or right, if
destroyed, will be destroyed to the extent that no pecuniary
compensation can provide replacement of the original or restore
exactly the status quo, 19 or that no fair or reasonable redress is
available at law. Money will only provide the injured person
with some substitute for the right of substance that was pre-
viously legally his and to the destruction of which he has had to
submit. There is no reason, from the standpoint of equity, why
a person should have to submit to the destruction or loss of a
substantial right which is legally his and accept something else
in its place.20 Nor is there any reason why he should have to
",Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 26 Sup. Ct. 91, 50
L.Ed. 192 (1905)
"s "The term 'irreparable injury,' however, is not to be taken in
its strict literal sense. The rule does not require that the threatened
injury should be one not physically capable of being repaired. If
the threatened injury would be substantial and serious-one not
easily to be estimated, or repaired by money-and if the loss or in-
convenience to the plaintiff if the injunction should be refused (his
title proving good) would be much greater than any which can be
suffered by the defendant, through the granting of the injunction,
although his title ultimately prevails, the case is one of such probable
great or 'irreparable' damage as will justify a preliminary injunc-
tion." MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 426 (1895)
'" Although destruction of some or all of the substance of the
estate or property or right originally seems to have meant injury
to the freehold by cutting of timber, quarrying rock or removal of
ore, injury to the substance of the estate which causes irreparable
injury is now exceedingly broad in its meaning. Kellogg v. King,
114 Cal. 378, 46 P 166, 55 Am. St. Rep. 54 (1896), holding that acts
which impaired or destroyed a hunting privilege impaired or de-
stroyed the substance of the right or estate or interest held, so as to
cause irreparable injury.
"' A court of equity will not license a wrong and compel the
owner of property to exchange what is Ins by right for some sub-
stitute. Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278 (1871).
"The plea that a remedy for money damages exists is made in
defense of every application for an injunction. In some ways, under
the law at least, any injury may be compensated by an award for
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subject to restriction to a remedy that cannot offer a fair and
reasonable redress.
Indeed, if equitable principles were followed to a logical
conclusion, there would seem to be no reason why a person should
have to submit to any wrong even though he can thereafter re-
cover money damages sufficient to replace in hind and quality
the very ting lost or destroyed, without appreciable change in
his status. In no civilized country should the jurisprudence
insist that a wrong be allowed to happen and compensation be
sought thereafter rather than preventing the occurrence of the
wrong. 21 One may, of course, distingish merely trivial22 matters
or matters for which other adequate remedies than equitable
exist to prevent the occurrence or repetition of the wrong.23
MULTIPLICITY OF AcTIONs AT LAW
One of the grounds frequently advanced as rendering the
remedy at law inadequate is that a multiplicity of actions will be
required. It is apparent that where the injury is recurring, one
action after another at law is required to recover for the dam-
ages as each act is done. Tis is expensive, time-consuming and
vexatious. Moreover, the repeated or continuous injuries may
eventually result in permanent or irreparable injury And too
money damages. Under the law even the taking of a human life may
be so compensated." Fox v. Krug, 70 F Supp. 721 (1947), to the
effect that regardless of existence of such remedy for money dam-
ages, irreparable injury will warrant injunction.
' Professor Walsh points out that the growth of modern equity
has been in the direction of granting specific relief more freely where
definitely superior to damages and that the code merger of law and
equity has contributed to this. WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY, See. 25
(1930).
"An illustrative maxim is that "Equity does not stoop to pick
up pins." Formerly, at least, in England and in some American juris-
dictions, arbitrary amounts have been imposed either by the courts
or by statute as requisite to equity jurisdiction. See LAWRENCE,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Sec. 43 (1929), who warns against application
of this principle of triviality where the relief sought is not properly
measurable by the pecuinary damage immediately imminent, as
where the grievance is a recurring one or one which may lead to
acquisition of a prescriptive right. Certainly distinction -must be
made between the merely trivial where some other remedy is avail-
able and the situation where a substantial right, although small in
dollar value, is threatened, as in Felsenthal v. Warring, supra, n. 10.
'As where a policeman may well be called. See Randall v.
Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 97 Pac. 669 (1908), Mechamcs' Foundry v Ryall,
75 Cal. 601, 17 Pac. 703 (1888).
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great a delay or failure to bring actions may result in the
wrongdoer acquiring an easement or adverse right.24 Of course,
the mere necessity of bringing a multiplicity of actions at law
as a ground for equitable relief would not, at first glane, seem
to meet the express requirement of many jurisdictions that it is
prerequisite to the obtaining of equitable relief that irreparable
injury be threatened with reasonable probability However, it
will usually be found, as already indicated, that the continued
recurrence of the injurious act may result in irreparable injury
or in the acquisition of an easement or other adverse right winch
by reducing the substance of the estate results in irreparable
injury It may also be noticed that irreparable injury is some-
times defined as one for which no fair and reasonable redress
is afforded.25
DAMAGES AT LAW SPECULATIVE OR CONJECTURAL
Another ground frequently advanced as rendering the
remedy at law inadequate is that damages are too speculative or
conjectural to provide a basis for seeking relief in an action at
law. However, such a ground usually exists in connection with
other grounds,26 or results particularly from the probable irre-
parable injury And indeed, irreparable injury is sometimes de-
fined, as already remarked, as an injury for which no safe meas-
ure of recovery is provided.27
INSOLVENCY
From a practical standpoint it might well be said that the
remedy at law by way of damages is more or less meaningless if
the defendant is insolvent. This consideration has led to the
view in many jurisdictions that the insolvency of the defendant
Although the term "multiplicity of actions at law" originally,
and still occassionally, seems to have been applied only to causes of
action against a plurality of persons, it is now also applied to the
situation of a succession of actions between the same parties. See
LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Sec. 872 (1929).
See discussion of "Irreparable Injury," supra.
See, e.g., Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 171 Md. 159, 188
Ati. 223 (1936), involving impossibility of measuring damages,
repetition of trespass and interference with peaceful enjoyment of
property
" See discussion of "Irreparable Injury," supra
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renders the remedy at law inadequate and is sufficient ground
alone for granting equitable relief.2s It should be pointed out,
however, that in many of the cases so holding the injury or
threatened injury is of such a nature that in any event the
remedy at law would not be adequate. In fact, some of the cases
remark on the immateriality of the circumstances whether the
defendant is insolvent or solvent, in view of the nature of the
threatened injury 29 Nevertheless, there are definitely situations
in which, but for the insolvency, the remedy at law would be
adequate and, hence, the fact of insolvency is the determinative
factor in construing the remedy at law as inadequate.30
On the other hand, in many jurisdictions it is considered
that the proper test continues to be whether the threatened
injury will be irreparable so that no relief at law would be ade-
quate, and that if the situation is ordinarily one in which a
remedy at law is adequate it is not determinative of the matter
that the judgment at law in the immediate case might not pro-
cure any pecuniary compensation. 31 However, in these jurisdic-
tions the concession is frequently made that insolvency of the
I Martin v. Davis, 96 Iowa 718, 65 N.W 1001 (1896), Clark v.
Flint, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 231, 33 Am. Dec. 733 (1839) Wilson v. Hill,
46 N.J. Eq. 267, 19 At. 1097 (1890). And see McClintock, Adequacy
of Ineffective Remedy at Law (1932) 16 MiNN. L. REV. 233; More-
land, Insolvency of Defendant as Basis of Equity Jurisdiction %n
Tort Cases (1933) 22 Ky. L. J. 1.
Conversely, mere fact that defendant is solvent does not defeat
equity jurisdiction, since recovery of damages may not, of course,
constitute as adequate and efficacious remedy as that available in
equity. See Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Hood, 167 Ga. 144, 145 S.E. 87(1928).
"See, e.g., Richards v. Dower, 64 Cal. 62, 28 Pac. 113 (1883).
As Professor Moreland points out, where waste or trespass in
the nature of waste is threatened, there is no adequate remedy at
law in any event. See Moreland, op. cit., supra, n. 28.
' "These situations are: (1) Where a repeated trespass or a
continuing trespass is likely to be committed by an insolvent de-
fendant over a short period of time, the remedy at law is adequate
in the absence of the element of insolvency (2) Where the asporta-
tion of non-unique personal property is threatened, the insolvency
of the defendant becomes a material factor in giving equity juris-
diction to grant preventive relief for in its absence there is an ade-
quate remedy at law." Moreland, op. cit., supra, n. 28.
nThompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S. 550, 6 Sup. Ct. 140, 29
L.Ed. 472 (1885), Tampa, etc., R. Co. v. Mulhern, 73 Fla. 146, 74 So.
297 (1917), Moore v. Halliday, 43 Ore. 243, 72 Pac. 801, 99 Am. St.
Rep. 724 (1903).
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defendant is a factor which may be considered in connection
with other matters in determining whether there is an adequate
or inadequate remedy at law 32
Which of the opposing views is the majority view is a mat-
ter of dispute, with the judges and legal writers usually de-
claring for the view which they happen to favor.3 3
OBJECTION TO EQUITY JURISDICTION, WAIVER
Objection to the existence or exercise of equity jurisdiction
is usually made on the ground that there is an adequate remedy
at law, 34 although it may also, in many jurisdictions, be made
on the ground that no property, or property rights, or rights in
the nature thereof are involved or threatened. According to the
practice of the particular jurisdiction, objection is made by de-
murrer or by motion or in the answer to the merits.3 5
If the objection is not raised in any form in the pleadings
is the objection waived or must the court take notice, of its own
motion, of the absence of equity jurisdiction 2 The answer to this
requires recognition of the fact that the term equity jurisdic
tion does not refer to jurisdiction in the sense of the power con-
ferred by the sovereign on the court over specified subject-mat-
ters or to jurisdiction over the res or the persons of the parties
in a particular proceeding, but refers rather to the merits. The
want of equity jurisdiction does not mean that the court has no
power to act but rather that it should not act, as on the ground,
for example, that there is an adequate remedy at law.36
Undoubtedly, in jurisdictions where law and equity are ad-
ministered in separate courts, the courts of equity, being loath to
invade the province of the courts of law, will take notice, of
11 Analysis may show, however, that the situation is one m which
in any event equity would grant relief on other grounds of made-
quacy of legal remedy See Moreland, op. cit., supra, n. 28.
1Conflicting opinions of writers are shown by MCCLINTOCK,
HANDBOOK OF EQUITY, Sec. 45 (1936), who favors the view that in-
solvency alone is ground for equitable relief, and WALSH, TREATISE
ON EQUITY, Sec. 63, (1930), who argues that it should not be.
IThat a remedy at law by way of money damages exists is
pleaded in defense of every application for injunction, is pointed out,
with some truth, in Fox v Krug, 70 F Supp. 721 (1947).
'As to modes of objecting in various jurisdictions, see Equity,
.30 C.J.S. 449 et seq. -
"See McClintock, op. cit., supra, n. 33, pp. 57, 58.
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their own motion, of the absence of equity jurisdiction. Indeed,
they may even be inclined to state that the availability of ade-
quate remedies at law goes to the very power of the courts of
equity to act.3 7 The usual view, however, as already indicated,
is that want of equity jurisdiction, as because of existence of an
adequate remedy at law, goes not to the power of the court but
to the merits.38
In this country, the widespread code merger of legal and
equitable powers in the same court has resulted in the tendency
of the courts to proceed to hear the petition for equitable relief
in the absence of an objection based on the ground of lack of
equity jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, so long as there is a
waiver by reason of failure of the defendant to object that there
is a lack of equity jurisdiction, the court does not take notice,
on its own motion, of any such lack and proceeds to render
equitable relief if the merits of the case warrant it.39 In other
jurisdictions, as in the federal courts, the failure to object is a
waiver only if the want of equity jurisdiction is not obvious. If
such want is obvious, the court may and should notice it of its
own motion.40
EQUITABLE CONDUCT OP COMPLAINANT
Pursuant to the equitable maxim that "He who comes into
equity must come with clean hands," the so-called "clean
hands" doctrine, the complainant seeking equitable relief must
not himself have been guilty of any inequitable or wrongful
conduct with respect to the transaction or subject-matter sued
on. Equity will not give relief to one seeking to restrain or en-
join a tortious act where he has himself been guilty of fraud,
illegality, tortious conduct or the like in respect of the same
matter in litigation.41 This is said to be a matter of public policy
and not a matter of defense. 42
See MERWIN, PRNCIPLES OF EQUITY 56 (1895)
'Viles v. Prudential Ins. Co., 124 F 2d 78 (1941).
As to this view in Massachusetts, see Merwm, op. cit., supra.
n. 37, p. 57.
'1Viles v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra n. 38. See also Pusey &
Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454, 67 L.Ed. 763
(1923).
"Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F 2d 505 (1947), Western Litho-
graph Co. v. W H. Brady Co., 71 F Supp. 383 (1947).
"White v. Baugher, -82 Colo. 75, 256 Pac. 1092 (1927).
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But the rule or doctrine applies only to the particular mat-
ter under consideration, for the court will not go outside of the
case for the purpose of examining the conduct of the complain-
ant in other matters or for the purpose of questioning his gen-
eral character for fair dealing.43 Even though the conduct of the
complainant is similar to that of the defendant or in respect of
similar matters, it is not ground for denial of equitable relief
where it is not connected with the matter in dispute between the
immediate parties, according to the usual rule. 44 It is true that
one finds statements to the contrary, to the effect that similar
but disconnected acts by the complainant constitute unclean
hands barring him from relief. 45 However, the cases cited to
these statements usually turn out, upon analysis, to be cases in
which the similar but disconnected acts of the plaintiff consti-
tuted a fraud upon the public, or involved the commission of
illegal acts injurious to the public or contrary to public policy,
or involved conduct verging on connection with, if not actually
connected with, the matter in litigation. It is also necessary to
keep in mind that the acts or conduct of the plaintiff not con-
nected with the matter sued upon, if causing injury to the de-
fendant himself, may place the plaintiff in equal guilt with the
defendant so far as inequitable conduct is concerned and thus
bar his right to relief.
An exception to the clean hands doctrine, as indicated in the
preceding paragraph, exists where the conduct of the complain-
ant, although not connected with the matter in litigation,
amounts to a fraud on or deceit of the public. In such cases, the
conduct of the complainant bars him from obtaining equitable
' Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399, 97 Atl. 312 (1916), Mills v.
Susanka, 68 N.E. 2d 904 (Ill. 1946) noted (1947) 33 VA. L. REV.
207" Tami v Pikowitz, 138 N.J. Eq. 410, 48 A. 2d 221 (1946).
"But a court of equity is not an avenger of wrongs committed
at large by those who resort to it for relief, however careful it may
be to withhold its approval from those which are involved in the
subject-matter of the suit, and which prejudicially affect the rights
of one against whom relief is sought." Kinner v. Lake Shore, etc.,
R. Co., 69 Ohio St. 339, 69 N.E. 614 (1903).
" Miller v Enterprise Canal Co., 142 Cal. 208, 75 P 770, 100 Am.
St. Rep. 115 (1904), wherein plaintiff canal company sought to
enjoin defendants from obstructing a river and diverting water
therefrom an violation of rights of canal company which was itself
obstructing another stream so as to constitute a public nuisance.
" See, e.g., Equity, 30 C.J.S.483, text and notes 40, 41.
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relief. 46 Although there is less certainty as to the situation where
the complainant's conduct does not fall exactly within the realm
of fraud on or deceit of the public but constitutes conduct vio-
lative of public policy,4 7 it logically appears that such latter
conduct is as injurious to the public welfare and should equally
constitute a bar to equitable relief.
Another somewhat similar maxim or principle is the one
that "He who seeks equity must do equity " This requires
that the one seelkng the equitable relief must himself, as a pre-
requisite to obtaining such relief, have done whatever is in his
power to restore the status quo. He must not seek to bring
about the cessation of the wrong to him and at the same time
retain any benefits, at the defendant's expense, that may have
accrued to him from the defendant's acts. This maxim, however,
will be found more applicable to equitable suits involving con-
tracts than to those involving torts. 48
The plaintiff must also not be guilty of laches, that is, he
must not be presenting or attempting to enforce a so-called
stale demand. According to the governing maxim, "Equity aids
the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." Inciden-
tally, this manner of stating the principle is somewhat mislead-
ing, since it disregards the element of the effect of the delay
For laches does not result from mere lapse of time but from the
fact that, during the lapse of time, changed circumstances in-
equitably work to the disadvantage or prejudice of another if
the claim is now allowed to be enforced. By his negligent delay,
the plaintiff may have misled the defendant or others into acting
on the assumption that the plaintiff has abandoned his claim,
or that he acquiesces in the situation, or changed circumstances
may make it more difficult to defend against the claim.4 9
" Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 23 Sup. Ct.
161, 47 L.Ed. 282 (1903) American University v Wood, 294 IlM. 186,
128 N.E. 330 (1920), A. N. Chamberlain Medicine Co. v. H. A. Cham-
berlain Medicine Co., 43 Ind. App. 213, 86 N.E. 1025 (1904).
"'See Skinner v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., supra n. 43, wherein
complainant railroad's conduct of being party to an illegal com-
bination in restraint of trade did not bar its relief.
," The similarity of the two maxims is discussed in Skinner v.
Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., supra n. 43.
'" See MERWIN, PRInCIPLES Or EQuITY 512, 513 (1895)
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Laches does not depend upon any fixed or arbitrary time
limit as does a statute of-limitations since it is not mere lapse of
time which constitutes laches. And statutes of limitations, unless
so providing, do not relate to suits of an equitable nature but
only to actions at law 50 Accordingly, a court of equity may re-
fuse relief on the ground of laches although pursuit of a legal
remedy on the same cause would not be barred by the applicable
statute of limitations, or it may grant relief after the bar of the
statute of limitations has been raised against the legal remedy r:
The discretion of the court, in view of the circumstances of the
case, is freely exercised.52 Sometimes the equity court does ap-
ply the analagous statute of limitations on the presumption
that the lapse of time fixed by the statute carries with it in-
jurious consequences.5 3
Since laches implies fault, lapse of time due to ignorance of
one's rights will not serve to constitute laches, if the ignorance
does not, of course, result from lack of diligence.54 This is also
true where disability operates to prevent the bringing of suit.55
BALANCING EQUITIES OR CONVENIENCES
A matter which may be highly determinative of whether
or not equitable relief should be granted is the doctrine variously
described as the balancing of equities or the balancing of con-
veniences or hardships. The rule commonly owes its existence
to development by courts in the exercise of equitable powers,5 6
5In MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 40, 41, (1936) it is ad-
vanced that, although originally statutes of limitation did not apply
to suits in equity latter day statutes do. Their application, however,
must be determined from their language. Walsh, in his TREATISE ON
EQUITY 474, 475 (1930), notes the existence in the code states of
statutes of limitation governing certain of the important equitable
suits.
' Stevenson v Boyd, 153 Cal. 630, 96 Pac. 284, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.)
525 '(1908)
52See Ide v. Trorlicht, 115 Fed. 137 (1903).
' See Note (1931), 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 341, alleging growing
tendency in tis regard.
I Citizens Nat. Bank v Blizzard, 80 W Va. 511, 93 S.E. 338,
L.R.A. 1918A 129 (1917).
'Scheel v Jacobson, 112 N.J. Eq. 265, 164 At. 270 (1933).
'That doctrine of balancing the equities in trespass cases has no
place in Louisiana jurisprudence, see Esnard v. Cangelosi, 200 La.
703, 8 So. 2d 673 (1942), noted (1942) 5 LA. L. REV. 41.
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but its application is authorized by statute in some states.5 7 Its
application will-be found most frequently in trespass and nui-
sance cases.
The doctrine or rule is sometimes stated to be that the
court will weigh the loss, injury or hardship resulting to the
respective parties from granting or withholding equitable re-
lief, that if the benefit resulting to the plaintiff from granting
the equitable relief will be slight as compared to the loss or
hardship caused to the defendant, the equitable relief will be
dEied. The plaintiff is left to the pursuit of damages as his
remedy ss
Too strict an application of the doctrine or rule, as the rule
was just stated, may lead too often to placing the plaintiff's
right to relief upon a dollars and cents basis, whereby what to
the plaintiff is a substantial right is lost or irreparably injured
simply because it does not approach in pecuniary amount the loss
or hardship that the defendant will suffer if relief is granted.
Accordingly, many courts refuse to follow or give weight to the
doctrine or rule as stated above. They insist that if a substantial
right of the plaintiff is endangered by the defendant's wrongful
act or threatened wrongful act, the latter will be enjoined even
though the loss or hardship, therefrom to the defendant exceeds
the pecuiary value of the plaintiff's right.5 9 If, however, the
right of the plaintiff is describable as trifling or insubstantial,
the loss or hardship to the defendant will be considered and
plaintiff left to a remedy by way of damages. 60 The doctrine
or rule may also properly include giving the defendant an op-
portunity to remove the cause of injury, instead of arbitrarily
"'In Obermiller, The Balance of Convernence Doctrine (1944) 19
NOTRE DAME LAw 360, the author cites Colorado, Georgia and Ten-
nessee statutes to this effect. Application of statutes in Colorado with
respect to mining, see Whiles v. Grand Junction Min. & Fuel Co.,
86 Colo. 418, 218 Pac. 260 (1920).
'See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113
Tenn. 331, 83 S.W 658 (1904)
Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P 2d 702 (1942), Whalen
v. Union Bag Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 805 (1913).
'In Tramonte v. Calarusso, 256 Mass. 299, 152 N.E. 90 (1926),
not only was the injury to plaintiff's land trifling in nature, but
plaintiff refused defendant access to accomplish removal of offend-
ing obstruction.
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throwing a severe loss upon him by flatly enjoining from all
further activities. 61
In either of the two approaches to the doctrine or rule, it
will be found that if the defendant's act is willfully tortious or
is committed with knowledge of the plaintiff's right, the courts
will refuse to balance the equities or conveniences and will
grant the equitable relief sought. It will be observed that the
defendant's conduct has been such as not to entitle him to con-
sideration on the part of the court.62
What may be described as another exception or qualifica-
tion occurs where the grant of equitable relief by restraint of
the defendant will affect the public convenience or rights of
the public. In such a situation the hardship upon or great in-
convenience to the public outweighs any right, however sub-
stantial, of the plaintiff to relief and he is left to his remedy in
damages. There is some difference of opimon among the courts
as to when the rights or conveniences of the public are involved.
Some courts have confined the balancing of equities or conven-
iences to situations where the defendant is in the nature of a
public service corporation, curtailment or prevention of whose
activities will definitely affect the public interest.63 It has been
said that to apply any balancing of equities in favor of a corpo-
ration essentially private in nature, for instance because it pays
large taxes and employs a great number of people locally, would
permit such a corporation in effect to condemn property of the
plaintiff for private purposes. 64 In other jurisdictions, though,
in such a situation the interest of the public has been considered
to outweigh the right of the plaintiff.65
'Payne v Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145 P 2d 552 (1944).
2 Tucker v Howard, 128 Mass. 361 (1880), Evangelical Lutheran
Church v Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 172 N.E. 455 (1930).
See Ukhtomski v Tioga Mut. Water Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 726,
55 P 2d 1251 (1936) Barger v City of Tekamah, 128 Neb. 805, 260
N.W 366 (1935).
' Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118
Pac. 928, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 436 (1911), Whalen v Union Bag Co.,
supra n. 59.
'Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn.
331, 83 S.W 658 (1904). See also Harris-Stanley Coal & Land Co.
v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 154 F 2d 450 (1946), cert. den. 329 U.S.
702, 67 Sup. Ct. 111, 91 L.Ed. 656 (1947)
